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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)( f) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by overruling the Defendant's 
objection and permitting the State's expert witnesses to express 
opinions as to what constitutes materiality in a securities fraud 
case? 
Standard of Appellate Review: While decisions to admit 
evidence are reviewed for "abuse of discretion", ff[w]hether a piece 
of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always 
review questions of law under a correctness standard . . . . [I]t 
is possible that we might refer casually to this standard as an 
'abuse of discretion' standard. In fact, it is not." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). State v. Clayton, 
646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982). 
2. Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury 
that specific intent to defraud is an element of the offense of 
securities fraud under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and (3) and 61-1-21? 
Standard of Appellate Review: A trial court's interpre-
tation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 
723, 726 (Utah 1982); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
1974); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93); 
State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989). 
3. Did the trial court err by failing to give an instruction 
to the jury that the good faith of the Defendant was a complete 
defense to a prosecution under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(1), (2) and (3) and 
61-1-21? 
Standard of Appellate Review: A trial court's interpre-
tation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 
723, 726 (Utah 1982); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah 
1974); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93); 
State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989). 
4. Did the Defendant receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Legal correctness. "But 
a correctness review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial 
court's resolution of factual questions and the associated 
determination of credibility that may underlie the decision to 
admit. This subsidiary determination will be overturned only if 
clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 
P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Grayson Roper v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470-71 (Utah 1989)." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 
(Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1070 (Utah 1985); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 
1/7/93). 
5. Did the trial court err by failing to dismiss Count IV of 
the Amended Information because the facts proven at trial did not 
constitute a public offense? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Legal correctness. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991); State 
v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93); State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
6. Did the trial court err by failing to dismiss Counts II 
and III because the facts proven at trial did not constitute a 
public offense? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Legal correctness. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991); State 
v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a Judgment and Conviction entered 
against the Defendant from his convictions on four counts of 
Securities Fraud, in violation of U.C.A. § 61-1-21. The Judgment 
and Conviction was entered by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on 
September 25, 1992. Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial or in 
3 
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the Alternative, Motion in Arrest of Judgment on or about January 
28, 1992. By Minute Entry dated May 22, 1992, the Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat denied the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Motion in Arrest of Judgment. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 
September 25, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 11, 1988, the Defendant became affiliated with 
Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Private 
Ledger") as a stockbroker (Tr. 716). The Defendant had been in the 
brokerage business since 1975 (Tr. 1124) and had passed several 
examinations required in the securities industry (Tr. 703). 
Private Ledger mailed the Defendant a procedures manual on April 
29, 1988 (Tr. 715) and received the Defendant's acknowledgement he 
had read its contents on May 11, 1988 (Tr. 715). In 1988, the 
Defendant learned about a limited partnership in undeveloped real 
property in the Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona, areas. The limited 
partnership was known as Red River Mountain. The Defendant was 
offered an opportunity to sell limited partnership interests in the 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership by the general partner, Ross 
Farnsworth (Tr. 1141-1145). 
For over thirteen years, the Defendant had acted as the 
investment broker for three clients: Seymour Issacs, Frank Brgoch, 
and Virl Thornton (Tr. 33, 200, 291). For many years the Defendant 
had been given discretion by his clients to make investments on 
their behalf (Tr. 206, 299, 1151). In the Defendant's professional 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judgment, Red River Mountain was the type of investment suitable 
for Mssrs. Issacs, Brgoch and Thornton based on their investment 
expectations and their investment history with him. 
On April 11, 1988, Seymour Issacs purchased six units of Red 
River Mountain for a total investment of $30,600.00. On April 29, 
1988, Virl Thornton purchased three units of Red River Mountain for 
a total investment of $15,300.00. On April 11, 1988, Frank Brgoch 
purchased six units of Red River Mountain for a total investment of 
$30,600.00. Each investor was issued a certificate on or about May 
9, 1988, indicating their interest was fully paid and non-
assessable. However, annual payments were called due by Red River 
Mountain in 1989 and thereafter. 
The Defendant knew that Private Ledger had not performed any 
due diligence on the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
However, the Defendant's manager at Private Ledger, Craig Cannon, 
advised the Defendant that he had notified Private Ledger and 
obtained clearance for the sale of the Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership (Tr. 1081, 1109). Other stockbrokers were also advised 
by the manager that the sales of the limited partnership had been 
approved by Private Ledger (Tr. 1156). 
The State alleged, inter alia, that when the Defendant sold 
the limited partnership interests to his clients, he willfully made 
an untrue statement of a material fact to Mr. Thornton (that he had 
purchased units in Red River Mountain for both himself and his 
father and that he was "selling away") (Tr. 641-642, 644); 
5 
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willfully omitted to state a material fact to Brgoch and Issacs 
(that they might be liable for future payments and that he was 
"selling away") (Tr. 831, 923). Additionally, the State contended 
the sale of the limited partnerships constituted securities fraud 
against Private Ledger because he intended to defraud Private 
Ledger of its percentage of the commission generated by the sale of 
the units of Red River Mountain to Issacs, Brgoch and Thornton. 
At the trial, the State was permitted, over objection, to 
present the "expert" testimony of Steven Neilson, the Assistant 
Director of the State of Utah Division of Securities, who opined 
that certain facts not disclosed to investors were material 
omissions (Tr. 895, 900). The Defendant was convicted by a jury of 
all four counts of Securities Fraud. 
The Defendant moved the trial court for a new trial or for an 
arrest of judgment on all four counts. The Defendant's Motion for 
New Trial and for Arrest of Judgment were both denied. This appeal 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Expert testimony on materiality under the securities law 
is improper. The trial court incorrectly admitted the opinion 
testimony of a compliance officer of the Defendant's brokerage 
house and the Assistant Director of the Utah State Division of 
Securities that certain facts allegedly omitted by the Defendant in 
his discussion with three investors were "material". The Court of 
Appeals, in the case of State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 
6 
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1992), held that the testimony was permissible because it went to 
"an ultimate issue of fact." In so ruling, the Court relied on 
vacated case authority and misconstrued Rule 704 Utah R.Evid. which 
abolished the "ultimate fact" rule. The Court of Appeals' decision 
conflicts with securities cases holding that expert testimony on 
materiality is inadmissible. 
2. Intent to defraud is an element of a violation of U.C.A. 
§§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. The trial court erred by ruling that intent 
to defraud is not an element of securities fraud under U.C.A. 
§§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. The Court of Appeals reached the same 
decision in State v. Larsen, supra. This interpretation collides 
with the interpretation of the related federal provision, Federal 
Rule 10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, on which Utah's 
act was patterned and with which Utah's law was intended to 
harmonize. See U.C.A. § 61-1-27. A violation of Rule 10b-5 
requires such intent. 
3. Good faith is a defense to securities fraud. Consistent-
ly/ good faith has been interpreted to be a defense under Rule 
10b-5. Utah's legislature intended U.C.A. § 61-1-1 to have the 
same interpretation. The trial court disagreed. The Court in 
State v. Larsen, supra, also disagreed. The Larsen decision 
permits a strict-liability conviction with possible imprisonment, 
as in this case, without proof of either an intent to defraud and 
regardless of the Defendant's good faith belief in his conduct. 
828 P.2d at 495-496. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 . The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Defense counsel failed to deliver an opening statement in this 
complicated securities fraud case. Additionally, defense counsel 
failed to introduce essential exculpatory evidence bearing upon the 
suitability of the three investors for the Red River Mountain 
Limited Partnership. Although the investors each testified that 
they had advised the Defendant that they were not interested in 
either risky investments or investments requiring future payments, 
their investment records with this Defendant belied those asser-
tions. In asserting this argument, the Defendant does not suggest 
that the mere suitability of the investors would preclude the 
Defendant from being guilty of securities fraud by failing to make 
a material disclosure. Rather, the Defendant asserts that the 
investment portfolio of the three investors was relevant because 
the nature of their investments contradicted their assertions that 
they had told the Defendant of their unwillingness to be involved 
in an investment like Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
Additionally, defense counsel failed to object when the State 
introduced evidence through the compliance officer of the 
Defendant's brokerage house and an attorney from the Utah Securi-
ties Division who testified, inter alia, that the Defendant's 
failure to disclose the possibility of future payments, that he was 
"selling away," and that his conduct was unethical and violated 
NASD rules, were irrelevant and immaterial to the jury's determina-
tion of whether the Defendant had violated U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1-21. Whether the Defendant's conduct violated internal policies 
of his brokerage house, or even that the Defendant would be held in 
low esteem by members of his profession, should have been excluded 
under Rule 403, Utah R.Evid. 
Defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Additionally, because the trial was permeated with 
an aura that the Defendant was an unethical stockbroker, trial 
counsel's cumulative errors establish a reasonable probability that 
but for the counsel's errors and omissions, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
5. The facts proven at trial in Count 4 do not constitute 
securities fraud. The State contended in Counts 1, 2, and 3 that 
the Defendant was guilty of securities fraud because he had failed 
to disclose facts which were material to an investor's investment 
decision. The State presented the testimony of all three investors 
that the Defendant had failed to disclose the possibility of future 
payments and had also failed to disclose that Private Ledger, his 
brokerage house, had not performed any due diligence regarding the 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. All three investors 
testified that the implicit endorsement of the sale of the limited 
partnership by the brokerage house was important to their decision 
to invest in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
The State also argued that the Defendant was guilty of 
securities fraud with Private Ledger as the victim because of his 
"selling away" in Counts 1, 2, and 3. In seeking a conviction on 
9 
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Count 4, the State is seeking more than the "pound of flesh" that 
it might be due under the facts of this case. The facts proven at 
trial do not establish a crime under U.C.A. § 61-1-1(3) in Count 4. 
6. The facts proven at trial do not constitute a public 
offense in Counts 2 or 3. The sale of the security - the limited 
partnership - in Counts 2 and 3 does not fit within the parameters 
of U.C.A. § 61-1-1. No misrepresentations or omissions were made 
by the Defendant "in connection with" the sale or purchase of the 
Red River Mountain units. The Defendant had discretionary 
authority to make investment decisions for these investors. If 
there were any misrepresentations or omissions by the Defendant, 
they occurred at a separate time from the actual purchase of the 
Red River Mountain units. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING THE DEFENDANTS 
OBJECTION AND PERMITTING THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS 
TO EXPRESS AN OPINION AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES MATERIALITY 
IN THIS SECURITIES FRAUD CASE. 
At the trial of this matter, the State called Donna Nauss, a 
non-lawyer, Compliance Director for Private Ledger, and Steve 
Neilson, the Assistant Director of the Utah Securities Division. 
Over the objection of defense counsel, both witnesses were 
permitted to opine in front of the jury what facts constituted a 
material omission by the Defendant in his dealings with the three 
investors. Ms. Nauss' testimony focused upon "selling away", i.e., 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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selling a security by the stockbroker independently and without the 
endorsement of the brokerage house: 
Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Assuming that a limited partnership 
had a series of possible future payments; which as 
Private Ledger's position as a compliance officer, what 
is Private Ledger's position on the need to disclose 
those future payments with regard to this paragraph? 
Mr. Barber: Objection, your Honor. That's not relevant. 
Mr. Barber: Your Honor, as to the violating of the laws of 
the State of Utah, the question is not of this agreement. 
The Court: The objection will be overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Let me ask you the question again 
because we didn't get an answer to it. As the compliance 
officer, what is Private Ledger's position on whether 
Paragraph 2-D requires disclosure of possible future 
payments in a limited partnership that has no possible 
future payment obligations? 
A (Ms. Nauss) The representative has an obligation to 
disclose everything about the investment, including the 
future payment obligations, if there are any, on the 
investment. 
Trial Transcript, Tr. 711-718. 
And later during Ms. Nauss' testimony, she was permitted to 
opine as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Would a failure to disclose a 
specific thing that you're doing that was in violation of 
this policy, such as "selling away" — let's do it 
specifically with something. Let's be narrow. 
(Same questioner) Would a failure to disclose "selling 
away" in light of these documents be an omission that, as 
the compliance officer of Private Ledger, you would view 
as material, and material can mean significant, impor-
tant? It could— 
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Mr. Barber: Well, that's a compound question your Honor. 
Mr. Sonnenreich: Just was the definition. 
The Court: Well, if she is confused, she can tell us. 
The Witness: Yes, it would be an omission. A material 
omission. Its important for us to know, and I think that 
you see in the "selling away" memorandum and in the 
procedures manual--
Trial Transcript, Tr. 766-767. 
Over the objection of defense counsel, Mr. Neilson was 
permitted to declare that "selling away" was illegal: 
Q: Now, looking at true selling away — we'll leave aside 
this other question of what happens if you have two 
brokerage houses. Is true selling away legal? 
A: No. It is illegal. 
i 
Trial Transcript, Tr. 895. 
Next, Mr. Neilson was permitted to opine that the possibility 
of future payments was a material issue which needed to be 
disclosed to an investor (Trial Transcript, Tr. 899). He was also 
permitted to express the opinion that the fact that a broker-dealer 
had not subjected an offering to a due diligence search was also a 
material fact which should have been disclosed to an investor 
(Trial Transcript, Tr. 899-900). Finally, Mr. Neilson was 
permitted to testify that the fact that an offering had been sold 
away from all brokerage houses was a material fact that should have 
been disclosed to a potential investor (Trial Transcript, Tr. 900). 
The Court, in overruling the objection, necessarily ruled that 
the question of what was "material" was a question susceptible to 
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opinion testimony by experts under Rule 702 of Utah R.Evid. The 
issue of materiality about which the witnesses were testifying did 
not involve scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge 
required by Rule 702, Utah R.Evid. Among other reasons, this is 
so because the jury was ultimately instructed in Instruction No. 21 
that: " . . . 3. A 'material fact' is a fact that a reasonable 
person would deem important in determining whether or not to 
purchase a security." Moreover, in Instruction No. 22, this Court 
advised the jury that: "A 'material' fact is a fact that a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would deem important in 
making a particular decision, such as a decision to purchase or 
sell a security." Since the standard is that of a reasonable man, 
Ms. Nauss' and Mr. Neilson's testimony as to materiality were 
inappropriate and unfairly prejudicial. 
Furthermore, in the elements instructions involving each count 
(Instructions 30 through 34), this Court instructed the jury that 
to find the Defendant guilty, they must find that he willfully made 
to an alleged victim "an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading." Therefore, the jury had the definition 
of "material fact" and understood that finding a misrepresentation 
or omission regarding a material fact was a required prerequisite 
to finding Mr. Harry guilty of securities fraud in all four Counts. 
With the testimony of the alleged investor-victims, and the other 
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testimony presented during the trial, the question of what was 
material or not material should have been left up to the jury, and 
was not so complicated that scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge was necessary for the jury to understand the 
evidence or to determine the facts at issue. 
The trial court concluded that it was perfectly proper to 
allow both Ms. Nauss and Mr. Neil son to opine, in essence, that 
"facts" the Defendant failed to disclose to his investors were 
"material." Mr. Neilson, in effect, rendered his expert opinion 
that the Defendant was guilty. The Defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial was denied by the trial court based upon this Court's 
decision in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992). The 
Defendant submits that the Larsen Court relied on invalid case 
authority when it found that expert testimony was proper because it 
went to "an ultimate issue of fact." 
1. The Larsen Court Disregarded the Correct Analysis of 
Federal Securities Actions Involving Expert Opinion and 
Relied on Vacated Case Authority 
Admission of the testimony of Ms. Nauss and Mr. Neilson was 
error under the analysis applied in federal securities cases. 
Securities cases pose unique problems in defining the scope of 
proper expert testimony. In the first of the leading decisions, 
Scop v. United States, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.modified on rehearing, 
856 F.2d 5 (1988), the defendant was convicted of federal securi-
ties fraud after the government introduced opinion evidence through 
an SEC official offered as an expert witness. Taken as a whole, 
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the expert opinions expressed that the defendant's actions 
constituted "manipulation" and "fraud" which were terms of the 
statute used to charge the defendant. Scop, 846 F.2d at 138. The 
Scop court found that the expert's use of statutory terms created 
an improper legal conclusion: 
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified 
that controlled buying and selling of the kind 
alleged here can create artificial price 
levels to lure outside investors, no sustain-
able objection could have been made. Instead 
Whitten made no attempt to couch the opinion 
testimony in even conclusory factual state-
ments but drew directly on the language of the 
statute and accompanying regulations concern-
ing "manipulation" and "fraud." In essence, 
his opinions were legal conclusions that were highly 
prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an 
expert in securities trading. 
Id. at 140. 
Fear that the jury may have been mislead by such testimony was 
heightened by the fact that statutory terms like "manipulation" and 
"scheme to defraud" are not self-defining, but have been the 
subject of diverse judicial interpretation. Id. at 140-41. 
The analysis in Scop is understandable and persuasive. Like 
the expert opinion in Scop, Mr. Neilson's testimony improperly drew 
on language of the statute under which the Defendant was charged — 
§ 61-1-1. (Trial Transcript, Tr. 898-900); U.C.A. § 61-1-1). Mr. 
Neilson's opinions "were calculated to invade the province of the 
court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as 
to that law." Id. at 140 citing F.A.A. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 622 
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(2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983). The Larsen Court 
failed to address this, remarking that the expert used the legal, 
statutory term "material" in a "factual" way. State v. Larsen, 
supra, at 493. Moreover, like the statutory term "manipulation,", 
disapproved for expert use in Scop, "materiality," an element of 
the offense charged here, is not a self-defining term. Id. 
Other securities cases confirm the problems associated with 
use of "securities expert" testimony regarding legal standards. In 
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), a "securities expert" 
testified concerning what he thought the contract phrase "best 
efforts" meant, and whether or not the defendants there had used 
"best efforts." Id. at 509. The expert also testified that 
failure to issue a registration statement within 70 days was proof 
that "best efforts" were not used. _Id. at 510. Finding this 
testimony an inadmissible legal opinion concerning "reasonableness" 
of delay in registration, the Marx court noted that securities 
fraud litigation presents a special danger of abuse of expert 
witness testimony: "With the growth of intricate securities 
litigation . . . we must be especially careful not to allow trials 
before juries to become battles of paid advocates posing as experts 
on the respective sides concerning matters of domestic law." Id. 
at 511. 
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986) is 
another example. There, the defendants attempted to call as an 
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expert witness an attorney who was former counsel for the defen-
dants. The attorney was to testify concerning whether certain 
omitted information was "material" to an investment decision. The 
court held such testimony inadmissible because the expert would in 
effect "testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicabili-
ty of the securities laws to the transactions [at issue], giving 
his expert opinion on the governing law." _Id. at 368. 
These cases reveal that while the opinions of Nauss and 
Neilson were not improper just because they went to an "ultimate 
issue," they were improper because they are not "otherwise 
admissible" (Rule 704, Utah R.Evid.); they "were legal conclusions 
that were highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as 
an expert in securities trading." Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.* Like 
the testimony in Marx and Adalman, the objectionable portions of 
Neilsonfs testimony "did not concern practices in the securities 
business on which [he] was qualified as an expert, but were rather 
•^oth Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that 
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what 
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often, as 
here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let alone 
the juror's minds. These cases also recognize that testimony of 
legal experts in securities fraud cases presents significant 
conceptual problems which reach beyond securities issues. See, 
e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 
1986) ("If such experts are to testify to the meaning and applica-
bility of securities laws, what line is to be drawn to exclude tort 
lawyers from offering their expert opinions to the jury as to the 
meaning and applicability of laws governing tort litigation. 
Examples of this sort could be multiplied across the gamut of 
litigation"). 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
legal opinions as to the meaning of the . . . terms at issue." 
Marx at 509. 
The Court of Appeals disregarded this authority and relied 
instead on language from United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d 179 (5th 
Cir. 1987), which apparently unknown to the Court of Appeals, was 
previously vacated. See United States v. Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 
1033 (5th Cir. 1987).2 Leuben, which involved neither securities 
claims nor actual testimony, consists of two reported decisions; 
the first, (the only one the Court of Appeals cites) noted that the 
parties had simply assumed that the issue of materiality under 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 was a question of law, while under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 
it was an issue of fact. 812 F.2d at 183. Relying on that 
assumption, the Leuben court held that expert testimony on a 
"factual" issue of materiality was permissible. _Id. It also held 
that under Rule 403 FedR.Evid., the trial court abused its discre-
tion by permitting the government to put on expert testimony on 
"materiality" while prohibiting similar testimony by the defense. 
Id. at 184. 
The second Leuben decision (overlooked by the Court of 
Appeals), vacated its prior assumption that "materiality" was a 
fact question and held that the issue correctly was one of the law. 
Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987). Given this subsequent 
2Stating that it was "persuaded by Leuben", the Court of 
Appeals characterized the case as follows: "In Leuben, the Fifth 
Circuit held that expert opinion on materiality was admissible as 
being fact-oriented." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 at 493. 
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correction, Leuben plainly does not stand for the proposition 
attributed to it by the Court of Appeals. State v. Larsen, supra, 
at 493. 
More importantly, even if the analysis of the first Leuben 
decision were valid, it would exclude Nauss and Neilson's testimo-
ny. The Leuben court characterized the proffered testimony as 
"fact-oriented" because it would have been phrased in terms of 
whether certain false statements would "'have the capacity to 
influence' a loan officer, not the legal question of whether the 
statements were 'material.'" Leuben, 812 F.2d at 184. Here, the 
responses of both Nauss and Neilson entered forbidden ground when 
they characterized information as "material." (Trial Transcript, 
Tr. 766-767, 898-900). Thus, even under Leuben, the responses of 
Nauss and Neilson, and the entire line of questioning viewed as a 
whole, fell within the range of evidence distinguished in Leuben as 
impermissible. Id. 
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Rule 704 
Rule 704 Utah R.Evid., modeled on the federal rule abolished 
the prohibition on opinion testimony going to an "ultimate issue of 
fact." Relying on Leuben, the Court of Appeals apparently read 
Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it goes to 
an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is not a legal 
conclusion. (Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493). This incorrect approach 
stands Rule 704 on its head. 
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Under Rule 704, evidence does not become admissible because it 
goes to an ultimate fact; rather it cannot be excluded only because 
it goes to an issue of ultimate fact.3 Testimony going to an 
ultimate fact issue may be inadmissible for other reasons; e.g., 
where, as here, that testimony embodies a legal conclusion. Scop, 
846 F.2d at 139-40. 
The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling problem 
created by the ultimate fact rule. (See Rule 704, Utah R.Evid. 
Advisory Committee Notes and Rule 704 Fed.R.Evid. Advisory 
Committee Notes). Yet the Court of Appeals' approach replaces on 
label with another. To say an issue is one of ultimate fact and 
not a legal opinion simply states the result and fails to clarify 
the basis for determination. "Materiality" in the context of a 
securities claim cannot be neatly labelled as a legal or a fact 
issue; it is a conclusion reached by applying an objective legal 
standard to a set of facts. Here, the analysis must focus on 
whether the expert improperly supplants the judge as law giver and 
as the jury instructor and on whether the opinions are "phrased in 
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria." Scop, 846 F.2d at 
140. 
3
 "The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the 
bars so as to admit all opinion. . . . [Rule 403, 701 and 702] 
afford ample assurances against opinions which would merely tell 
the jury what result to reach." Marx, 550 F.2d at 511 n.17, citing 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rule 704, Fed. R. Evid. 
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The testimony of Nauss and Neilson is not troublesome because 
they gave evidence of a factual predicate for materiality. The 
error occurred when they were permitted in effect to instruct the 
jury that in their opinion the Defendant failed to disclose 
material facts; in essence, that the Defendant was guilty. (Trial 
Transcript, Tr. 766-767, 899-900). This is not proper, as the 
Court explained in Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 770 F.2d 
1303 (5th Cir. 1985). There, the trial court excluded proffered 
expert testimony based on broach hypothetical questions that 
assumed every relevant fact that required the expert to give legal 
opinions on the complex personal injury case, including proximate 
cause. 16.. at 1311. The Court affirmed, noting that the defendant 
was "asking his expert to tell the jury what result to reach after 
having been told all of the facts possibly relevant to the case." 
Id. at 1311. This case is no different. By admitting Nauss and 
Neilsonfs testimony, the trial court allowed the State's experts to 
instruct the jury on its result after rehearsing the facts of the 
State's case. 
This error is compounded by Mr. Neilson's status as an 
attorney and securities regulator. The forceful impact of his 
ostensibly vast, specialized knowledge as an attorney in the 
securities area prevented subsequent correction of his improper 
testimony. This was explained in Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 
(10th Cir. 1988). In Specht, a 1983 Civil Rights action for 
unlawful search, an attorney expert-witness for the plaintiff 
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considered "hypothetical" circumstances which, according to the 
court, merely restated the plaintiffs' view of the evidence. Id. 
at 807. The attorney witness testified that as a constitutional 
expert, he believed no consent had been given and that the search 
violated constitutional rights. Id. at 809. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that the witness supplanted both the trial court 
and jury with the "array of legal conclusions." ^d. The error was 
not harmless: 
[G]iven the pervasive nature of this testimo-
ny, we cannot conclude its admission was 
harmless. There is a significant difference 
between an attorney who states his belief of 
what law should govern the case and any other 
expert witness. 
Id. at 808. 
Like the attorney witness in Specht, Mr. Neilson, an attorney 
and securities regulator, "imbued with all the mystique inherent in 
the title 'expert,'" heightened the "substantial danger" that "the 
jury simply adopted the expert's conclusions rather than making its 
own decision." _Id. at 809. The error of admitting his testimony 
could not be corrected by cross-examination, rebuttal, or instruc-
tion as the Court of Appeals suggests. Id. See also United States 
v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy 
judge concerning his prior order and availability of interim fees 
not curable by cross-examination); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' 
Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1977) (" [Compelling the 
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opponent to cross-examine to repair the damage is to invite 
disaster"). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS AN ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE OF SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) 
AND (3) AND 61-1-21. 
The Amended Information in the instant case charged three 
different theories to prove a violation of the Securities Fraud 
Statute. The trial court instructed the jury that the specific 
intent to defraud was only an element of one of the three theories 
set forth in the Securities Fraud Statute. In Instruction No. 26, 
the Court advised the jury in part pertinent hereto, that: 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty 
under the theory that he employed a device, 
scheme or artifice to defraud, the State of 
Utah must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
it was the defendant's specific intent to 
defraud some person. 
However, later in the instruction, the Court noted that: 
Even if you find that the defendant acted in 
good faith, however, you shall still convict 
the defendant if the State establishes beyond 
a reasonable doubt each element of either one 
of the other two theories, (1) that the defen-
dant made an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omitted to state a necessary fact, or 
(2) that the defendant engaged in an act, 
practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate to defraud or deceive. 
Additionally, in Instruction No. 24, this Court advised the 
jury that with regard to the false representation or omission 
theory: 
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You are instructed that no amount of belief, 
honest or otherwise, by the defendant that any 
enterprise or business would ultimately make 
money for the investors excuses or justifies 
false representations or omissions willfully 
made by him. Therefore, to the extent that 
there exists any such belief, it does not 
constitute a defense to the crimes alleged in 
this case if you find that the defendant has 
engaged in willful misstatements or omissions. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on numerous occasions that 
a jury must be instructed with regard to all the legal elements 
that it must find in order to convict a defendant of the crime 
charged, and the absence of such an instruction is reversible error 
as a matter of law. See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). 
In State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985), the Court stated, 
"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error." Id. at 239. Thus, the failure to 
give an appropriate elements instruction can never be deemed 
harmless error. See State v. Jones, 177 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 (1/14/92). 
In State v. Jones, the defendant's counsel failed to object to the 
lack of an elements instruction on aggravated kidnapping. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the absence of a proper elements instruc-
tion constituted clear error and required a reversal of the 
conviction. .Id. at 4. Thus, in the instant matter, regardless of 
whether the Defendant's predecessor counsel objected to the 
foregoing instructions, the fact that the jury was not instructed 
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in an elements instruction that the specific intent to defraud was 
an element of each of the three theories set forth under U.C.A. 
§ 61-1-1 constitutes clear error and requires the granting of a new 
trial. 
The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
on this issue, again relying upon the precedent of this Court in 
State v. Larsen, supra. The Defendant submits that the Larsen 
Court erroneously failed to construe U.C.A. § 61-1-1(2) in harmony 
with the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
related federal provisions (Rule 10b-5) on which § 61-1-1 was 
patterned. 
1. Section 61-1-1 Was Patterned After Rule 10b-5. 
In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain revisions 
unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform Act"). This 
is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah Act"). See 
U.C.A. § 61-1-28. Section 101 of the Uniform Act (§ 61-1-1 of 
Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") Rule X-10B-5 (Rule 10b-5). See Uniform 
Securities Act § 101, Official Comment, reprinted in Louis B. Loss, 
Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 6 (1976). The language of 
the three classes of proscribed activity under § 61-1-1 and Rule 
10b-5 is identical. Compare U.C.A. § 61-1-1 and 17 C.F.R. 
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§ 240.10b-5. Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5, 
criminal penalties are set for any "willful" violation.4 U.C.A. 
§ 61-1-21; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
Another holding in the Larsen case was that "willfulness" and 
not "specific intent to defraud" is the required mental state in a 
criminal securities fraud prosecution under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 
61-1-21 (1989). "The trial court, therefore, properly instructed 
the jury that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities 
fraud is 'willfulness1 rather than specific intent as proposed by 
Larsen." 828 P.2d at 495. 
The intent of Rule 10b-5 was derived from § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), (not § 17a of 
the 1933 Act), which empowered the SEC to act and which provided 
the standard of liability that must be imposed. 425 U.S. at 200.5 
Rule 10b-5 "was adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commis-
sion under § 10(b) . . .to carry into effect the will of Congress 
as expressed by the statute." (425 U.S. at 212-13). The 
4Mr. Harry does not challenge the trial court's instruction on 
"willfulness." (Instruction No. 12; Tr. 250). Willfulness is also 
an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court and the Larsen 
court erred by refusing to instruct that scienter was a separate, 
additional element of the offense. 
5Congress fashioned standards of fault on a particularized 
basis under the securities laws. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. at 200. "Ascertainment of congressional intent with 
respect to the standard of liability created by a particular 
section of the Acts must therefore rest on the language of that 
section." Id. Here, the sole focus of inquiry is § 10(b) under 
which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated. Congressional intent for other 
sections, such as § 17a of the 1933 Act, is thus irrelevant. 
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Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act confirms that 
Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform state fraud 
provision because of the language disparities in existing state 
statutes and "because of the substantial body of judicial precedent 
which has been developed under the federal provisions." Louis B. 
Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 7 (1976) (emphasis 
supplied). 
This comment also reveals that the draftsmen anticipated that 
adopting states would construe § 101 in harmony with federal court 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. A prominent commentator on Utah law 
(Professor Wallace Bennett) presumed that federal and state court 
construction of like provisions would be identical. See Wallace F. 
Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of History and the 
New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L. Rev. 216, 232 n.112 ("Similarity to 
the federal statute will allow for interchangeability of judicial 
precedence in this important area"). 
Utah's legislature expressed synonymous intent. Aware of the 
Utah Act's federal origin, Utah's legislature declared that the Act 
was intended not only to encourage uniformity among the states, but 
"to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation." U.C.A. § 61-1-27 
(emphasis supplied). The Utah Act should be construed to effectu-
ate this "general purpose". Id. 
In U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed 
in Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960), the eminent Judge 
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Wyzanski directly addressed the issue of whether specific intent to 
defraud is an element of federal securities fraud under the 
Securities Act of 1933: 
"To secure a conviction under Count 10 the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt not merely that there was an omission, 
that the omission was material and that Danser 
knew of the omission, but also that Danser 
intended to defraud," 
26 F.R.D. at 588 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that a 
private civil action for damages will not lie under Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, in the absence of a specific allegation of intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 193 (1976), the Court held as follows: 
We granted certiorari to resolve the ques-
tion of whether a private cause of action for 
damages will lie under Sec. 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of 
"scienter" -- intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud. 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1557, 43 
L.Ed.2d 773 (1975). We conclude that it will 
not and therefore we reverse. 
425 U.S. at 193 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
In Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977), the 10th Circuit expounded upon the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ernst as follows: 
A significant clarification has taken place 
in this body of law as a result of the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). Prior to this decision 
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there had been a division in the circuits as 
to the need for proving scienter. Ernst & 
Ernst, supra, has settled this conflict by 
holding that proof of negligence is not enough 
in a 10b-5 action; that such an action will 
not lie in the absence of an allegation and 
proof of scienter, the same being an "intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 
425 U.S. 193, 96 S.Ct. at 1381 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing analysis of case law and 
Utah statutes, Defendant submits that the State was required at 
trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
specifically intended to defraud the investors named in Counts 1 
through 3 and Private Ledger in Count 4 of the Amended Information 
under all three of the theories set forth in the elements Instruc-
tion Nos. 30-34. Failure to so instruct the jury deprived the 
Defendant of a fair trial and his rights to due process of law 
under both the Utah and United States Constitutes were therefore 
violated. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION 
TO THE JURY THAT THE GOOD FAITH OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A 
COMPLETE DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION UNDER U.C.A §§ 
61-1-1(1), (2), (3) AND 61-1-21. 
Again, the Larsen case effectively resolves this issue in 
favor of the State by implication. The good faith defense is the 
flip side of the specific intent coin. If the prosecution must 
prove that the Defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud 
the victim, then the Defendant can defend by claiming that he acted 
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with subjective good faith, and without an intent to defraud the 
victim. 
i 
Although the issue of whether the "good faith" of a defendant 
in a criminal securities fraud prosecution constitutes a defense 
has not been directly addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals has directly addressed this question in 
numerous cases involving the federal criminal securities fraud and 
mail fraud statutes. In Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 
1955), the defendant argued that the following jury instruction, 
which rejected a defense of "good faith", was erroneous: 
"It is contended by the defendant vigorously 
that he believed the statements he made and 
that there was no intention upon his part to 
commit a fraud. However, you are instructed 
that if the statements made by the defendant 
were false and there was no basis for such 
statements except the hope and belief of the 
defendant that he could produce the oil, and 
that he made the statements in good faith, 
that contention would be no defense, becausse 
if the statements within themselves were false 
or based purely upon speculation and caused 
the investors to rely upon the statements €is 
true, the defendant's acts would constitute an 
offense regardless of his good faith." j 
220 F.2d at 564-65 (emphasis added). 
The 10th Circuit Court rejected this instruction and held as 
follows: ' 
While the meaning of this instruction is not 
entirely clear, we are forced to conclude that 
it, in effect, declares that, if the jury 
should find that false statements were made 
which were relied upon by investors, an of-
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fense was committed even if such statements 
were made in good faith. 
This was an erroneous instruction. 
220 F.2d at 565 (emphasis added). 
In several cases subsequent to Frank, the 10th Circuit Court 
has consistently reaffirmed that "good faith" is a complete defense 
to a criminal prosecution under the federal securities fraud and 
mail fraud statutes. See Beck v. U.S., 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 
1962); Steiger v. U.S., 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1962); Sparrow v. 
U.S., 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1968); U.S. v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285 
(10th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401 (10th Cir. 1988); 
and U.S. v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1988). 
After reviewing its previous decisions in Beck and Steiger, 
that "good faith is a complete defense to a mail fraud prosecu-
tion, " the 10th Circuit Court in Sparrow held as follows: 
Thus the good faith of the defendant in the 
plan or scheme and good faith intention to 
carry out the promises and representations 
constitutes a defense which the defendant may 
assert in a prosecution both under the Mail 
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, and the 
fraud portions of the Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a). 
402 F.2d at 828-29 (emphasis added). 
Recently, in U.S. v. Cronic, supra, the 10th Circuit Court 
stated that: "We have long held that good faith is a complete 
defense to a mail fraud charge as have other circuits." (Emphasis 
added). 839 F.2d at 1403. The Court was merely reiterating the 
doctrine it had declared in 1968 that the good faith of a defendant 
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"in the plan or scheme and good faith intention to carry out the 
promises and representations" constitutes a complete defense to a 
securities fraud prosecution. Sparrow v. U.S., supra, at 402 F.2d 
828-29. 
When a defense to a criminal prosecution is raised, whether by 
the defendant's or the prosecution's own evidence, the prosecution 
has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense 
does not apply. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) (when 
self-defense is raised as a defense, the prosecution has the burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in 
self-defense). The trial court's failure to give a good faith 
instruction deprived the Defendant of his most important factual 
defense — that he had a good faith belief that there would be no 
future payments in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
(See Instruction 24; Tr. 262 - good faith not a defense). The 
trial court's refusal to submit an instruction applying good faith 
to all three of the State's theories denied the Defendant his right 
to a fair trial and due process of law under both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions and he is therefore entitled to a new 
trial on all four counts of Securities Fraud. 
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POINT IV 
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE NECESSITATE GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON COUNTS 1, 2 AND 3 BECAUSE 
HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
The applicable standard in assessing an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim was set forth in Strickland v. Washington/ 466 
U.S. 668 (1984). This case set forth a two-part standard for 
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first 
prong is that "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show 
that counsel's representations fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 687-688. The second prong requires 
that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 694. 
1. Trial Counsel's Representations Fell Below an Objective 
Standard of Reasonableness. 
The first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing 
more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence. 
Thus, the inquiry must focus upon whether the counsel's advice or 
representation of the defendant "was within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal matters." McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
In the instant matter, the errors and omissions of trial 
counsel which "fall outside the wide range of professional and 
competent assistance" demanded of attorneys in criminal cases are 
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enumerated below. See, State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986): 
1. Defense counsel failed to deliver an opening statement to 
the jury in a complicated securities fraud trial. This was not a 
strategic decision. Defense counsel intended to give an opening 
statement but failed to give one because he forgot (Tr. 956-957). 
2. Based upon Mr. Thornton's testimony, the State contended 
in Count 1 that Mr. Thornton had no knowledge of the possibility of 
future payments. However, Mr. Thornton's testimony that he had no 
knowledge of the possibility of any future payments could have been 
easily and convincingly contradicted by the introduction of the 
signed and notarized Subscription Agreement (Tr. 467-477) as well 
as the initialled Suitability Questionnaire (Tr. 454-463). Trial 
counsel failed to introduce either the Subscription Agreement or 
the Suitability Questionnaire, notwithstanding that the Defendant 
had specifically advised him that he should impeach Mr. Thornton 
with the aforementioned documents. When trial counsel realized he 
had neglected to introduce the Subscription Agreement and the 
Suitability Questionnaire through Mr. Thornton, the State's 
witness, it was too late — Mr. Thornton had been released and had 
returned to Yuma, Arizona. The State objected to the introduction 
of the documents through the Defendant, and as a result, these 
critically important documents were not presented to the jury. 
3. Trial counsel failed to demonstrate Mr. Thornton's 
suitability for the Red River Mountain investment. Notwithstanding 
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Mr. Thornton's testimony, his net worth was $1,000,000.00; his 
stock and bond portfolio were valued in excess of $400,000.00; he 
was a partner in a trailer park development in Sandy, Utah with an 
approximate value of $300,000.00 to $400,000.00 where Mr. Thornton 
was subject to unlimited liability; and the $15,000.00 investment 
in the Red River Mountain limited partnership represented less than 
two percent (2%) of Mr. Thornton's net worth and four percent (4%) 
of his investment portfolio. Thus, the Red River Mountain invest-
ment was well within the reasonable limits of the "prudent man" 
investment rule. Defendant provided his trial counsel with an 
outline of the foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to 
explore the foregoing points. (See Appendix 1, Defendant's post-
trial Exhibits 5, 6 and 7). 
4. Trial counsel failed to demonstrate the suitability of the 
Red River Mountain limited partnership for Mr. Issacs in Count 2. 
Mr. Issacs had a portfolio value of over $600,000.00; he had 
participated in at least ten other partnerships; and a $30,000,00 
investment in the Red River Mountain limited partnership repre-
sented only five percent (5%) of his total portfolio value. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Issacs' testimony, the investment in the Red 
River Mountain limited partnership constituted reasonable diversi-
fication and satisfied the "prudent man" investment rule. Again, 
the Defendant provided his trial counsel with an outline of the 
foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to explore the foregoing 
points. (See Appendix 2, Defendant's post-trial Exhibits 1 and 2). 
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5. Trial counsel failed to demonstrate the suitability of the 
Red River Mountain limited partnership for Mr. Brgoch in Count 3. 
Mr. Brgoch had a portfolio value of over $600,000.00; he had been 
a participant in at least 14 other partnerships; the $30,000.00 
investment in the Red River Mountain Investment represented only 
five percent (5%) of his total portfolio value. The investment in 
the Red River Mountain limited partnership constituted reasonable 
diversification and satisfied the "prudent man" investment rule. 
The Defendant provided his trial counsel with an outline of the 
foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to explore the foregoing 
points. (See Appendix 3, Defendant's post-trial Exhibits 3 and 4). 
6. Without objection from counsel, the State was permitted to 
introduce the opinion of Ms. Nauss, the Private Ledger compliance 
officer, that the Defendant's conduct violated the internal rules 
and regulations of Private Ledger. Ms. Nauss based her opinions 
upon the Private Ledger compliance manual. However, this manual 
was not mailed to the Defendant until after two of the Red River 
Mountain sales had been consummated and was not returned by the 
Defendant to Private Ledger until after the final sale had been 
completed (Tr. 715-716). Moreover, the testimony is neither 
relevant nor probative on the issue of whether this Defendant 
violated U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. Defendant submits that 
under Rule 403 this evidence should have been excluded. 
Similarly, Ms. Nauss was also permitted to testify that 
Private Ledger could have been subjected to civil liability as a 
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result of the Defendant's "selling away" and failure to disclose a 
material fact - the possibility of future payments: 
Q Now besides the fact that Private Ledger was denied a 
potential of some commissions; what other harm did this 
conduct of not notifying Private Ledger of Red River 
Mountain subject Private Ledger to? 
A Well, if someone who made an investment in that product 
were hurt by making that investment, they may assume that 
Private Ledger had been involved in and that we were a 
party to that transaction, even though they didn't even 
know about it, and weren't asked to review it. And 
didn't have the opportunity to say whether or not our 
representative could sell it. They may assume, because 
the representative was licensed with the firm, that we 
were a party to the transaction. 
Q In your experience, could that cause the risk of a 
lawsuit, regardless of whether you might win it in the 
end—the risk you have to go through in a lawsuit and 
other litigation, in your experience? 
A Yes. It could. 
Q And those, I take it, could be expensive matters for 
Private Ledger. 
A They could be very expensive. 
(Trial Transcript, Tr. 724-725). 
As with the unobjected questions discussed supra, these 
questions had no probative value, and should have been excluded 
under Rule 403, Utah R.Evid. Even if this Court declines to reach 
the improperly preserved issue under Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, the Defendant submits that it was plain error under State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) and State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1989), and should therefore be reviewed under that precedent. 
Finally, although trial counsel did object when the State 
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began to introduce testimony concerning the NASD rules and 
regulations, he neglected to move to strike the testimony. The 
NASD is a voluntary organization of securities dealers and brokers. 
A violation of NASD rules , and regulations has no bearing upon 
whether this Defendant violated U.C.A. § 61-1-1. The following 
colloquy occurred before the jury: 
Q What is that relationship [the securities regulations of 
the State of Utah and the NASD rules]? 
A First its contained in Rule 177-6-1G. That rule refers 
to ethical or unethical and dishonest practices of 
broker-dealer agents. One of the provisions of that rule 
Mr. Barber: Objection to any of the provisions your Honor. 
The rule is the best evidence. It is hearsay. 
(Trial Transcript, Tr. 881-882). 
The Defendant submits that the proper objection should have 
been Rule 403, Utah R.Evid., not hearsay. An expert is permitted 
to base his testimony upon hearsay. The NASD rules and regulations 
would clearly be within the scope of this witness' expertise. 
Accordingly, defense counsel should have been arguing that even a 
deviation from industry standards - as evidenced by a violation of 
NASD rules and regulations - had no probative value, or alterna-
tively, that the minimal probative value was outweighed by the 
extraordinary prejudicial effect upon the jury. After extensive 
arguments with the Court, the State elected to forego this line of 
inquiry. However, defense counsel did not request that the 
testimony be stricken. As a result, the jury was left with the 
lingering impression that the Defendant's conduct was unethical. 
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Marshalling the facts in support of the trial court's denial 
of a motion for a new trial, it could be said that all of counsel's 
omissions were conscious, strategic decisions and that none of the 
omissions would have altered the outcome of the case. However, the 
Defendant submits that these omissions evidence that trial "counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner." 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (1989). 
2. Prejudice Requirement. 
The second, or prejudice requirement, under the Strickland v. 
Washington and State v. Verde tests focuses upon whether counsel's 
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of 
the trial process. In other words, in order to satisfy the 
prejudice requirement, the Defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors and omissions, 
the result of the trial would have been different. As stated in 
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 686: 
[T]he benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result. 
In the instant matter, the second part of the Strickland test 
has also been met. The cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors 
or omissions certainly undermines confidence in the jury's verdicts 
on Counts 1, 2 and 3. The failure to present an opening statement 
in a complicated securities fraud trial is remarkable. Further-
more, the failure of trial counsel to challenge the representations 
39 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the three investors with regard to the suitability of the Red 
River Mountain limited partnership, in view of the fact that the 
Defendant had provided his counsel with a detailed outline of their 
investment histories which included participation in both land 
deals, partnerships, and long term investments falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and certainly leads one to the 
ineluctable conclusion that but for counsel's defective perform-
ance, a different outcome could have been reached on all three of 
these Counts. Finally, with respect to Count 1, the failure of 
trial counsel to introduce a signed and notarized Subscription 
Agreement which would have directly contradicted Mr. Thornton's 
testimony cannot be emphasized enough. Mr. Thornton's credibility 
was essential to the State's prosecution in Count 1. Had trial 
counsel introduced the signed and notarized Subscription Agreement 
which clearly set forth the existence of the possibility of future 
payments, there can be little doubt that Mr. Thornton's credibility 
would have been seriously impeached. 
Under the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
the Defendant has satisfied the two-prong test. For all of these 
reasons, the interests of justice will best be served by granting 
the Defendant a new trial on Counts 1, 2 and 3. 
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POINT V 
THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC 
OFFENSE IN COUNT 4 OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION, 
Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court, dissenting on other 
grounds, stated in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989): ". . . The whole thrust of 
criminal procedure in the area of appellate review of criminal 
convictions has been to try to avoid, where possible, collateral 
attacks on criminal convictions. For that reason, it makes sense 
to address at the earliest possible stage errors which might lead 
to reversals. . ." 773 P.2d at 42. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure reads: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sen-
tence, the court upon its own initiative may, 
or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest 
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do 
not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other 
good cause for the arrest of judgment. . . . 
The facts proven at trial do not constitute a public offense 
with regard to Count 4. The contracts and documents executed 
between Private Ledger and the Defendant do not constitute either 
a device, a representation, or a course of business, in connection 
with the offer, sale or purchase of any security as required under 
U.C.A. § 61-1-1. As Ms. Nauss admitted, the Defendant did not 
receive the manual prohibiting discretionary accounts at any of the 
relevant times to this case. Indeed, the manual was not received 
by the Defendant until May 3, 1988. It was not returned to Private 
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ledger until May 11, 1988, more than one month after the purchase 
of the Red River Mountain interests by all three investors (Tr. 
715). The facts proven by the State may constitute a breach of ' 
contract with Private Ledger, but they do not constitute the 
commission of a public offense. 
In State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah { 
Court of Appeals ruled that whenever the State advances a unique or 
novel theory of criminal liability in what normally would be a 
civil business situation, the appellate courts will require the i 
prosecution to meet the "incumbent burden of sound reasoning and 
persuasive authority" in order to uphold a guilty verdict." In the 
Burton case, the Defendant attempted to sell a home to one Waldron. i 
The home in question was encumbered by two trust deeds, with the 
first trust deed containing a "due on sale" clause, barring 
assumption of the note obligation by any subsequent purchaser. < 
Waldron was unable to obtain financing through the note holder with 
the "due on sale" clause, so he entered into a private financing 
agreement with Burton. Waldron was to make monthly payments to ( 
Burton, who would then make the mortgage payment to the holder of 
the trust deed with the "due on sale" clause. It would not be 
reported to the holder of the "due on sale" clause that the home < 
had been sold to another purchaser without the bank's permission. 
Although it was understood that Burton was to make the 
mortgage payments to the bank, it was not explicit in the agreement ( 
executed by the parties. Subsequently, Burton obtained the monthly 
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payments from Waldron, but failed to make those payments to the 
bank which resulted in the bank's ultimate foreclosure on the 
property. The State brought theft charges against Burton, claiming 
that his failure to apply the payments he had received from Waldron 
to the bank constituted the crime of theft. 
In analyzing the case, Judge Orme stated as follows: 
The state advances a unique theory of criminal 
liability in this case. It is quite telling 
that neither side has presented the court with 
any decision validating or precluding the 
criminal prosecution of what is essentially a 
breach of a real estate sale agreement. We 
are not unreceptive to novel theories of law 
when they are supported by firm logic and have 
some basis, even if tangential, in established 
precedent. However, the more unique the 
innovation, the greater will be the incumbent 
burden of sound reasoning and persuasive 
authority. Such reasoning and authority are 
notably absent in this case. 
In that posture, we are loath to give approval 
to the broad construction of Section 76-6-404 
(the theft statute) urged upon us by the 
state. Were we to do so, it is likely that 
memorials of commercial transactions would 
soon be drafted to include boilerplate : an-
guage designed to impose criminal liab^^ ty 
for interruptions in the stream of payments 
— a circumstance which would normally be 
nothing more than a breach of contract, tradi-
tionally viewed as adequately remedied through 
an action of law. 
800 P.2d at 819. 
It can be readily seen that the facts established by the State 
in the instant matter might establish an actionable breach of 
contract by the Defendant and enforceable by Private Ledger. 
However, this is precisely the situation Judge Orme indicated in 
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State v. Burton/ supra, should be handled civilly and not criminal-
ly. The effort by the Attorney General's Office to bootstrap this 
civil breach of contract (Count 4) into a criminal prosecution must 
be rejected by this Court. In any event, the conduct alleged in 
Count 4 — selling away — is the same conduct alleged by the State 
to constitute a material omission in the sale of the securities in 
Counts 1, 2, and 3. Count 4 must therefore merge with the first 
three counts of the Information. 
POINT VI 
THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
A PUBLIC OFFENSE IN EITHER COUNTS 2 OR 3. 
The State did not prove a violation of the Securities Fraud 
Statute in Counts 2 or 3 because there were no misrepresentations 
or omissions made "in connection with" the sale or purchase of the 
Red River Mountain Units. All of the transactions were executed by 
the Defendant before any statements which might be characterized as 
either misrepresentations or omissions were made by the Defendant 
to either Mr. Issacs or Mr. Brgoch. Both Issacs and Brgoch 
i 
testified that they had delegated the authority to make investment 
decisions for them to the Defendant and that he had invested their 
money in Red River Mountain before they knew that the investment 
i 
had been made. The record is clear; indeed, there is not one shred 
of evidence that Defendant Harry made any representation to either 
Issacs or Brgoch regarding Red River Mountain before he exercised 
i 
his discretionary delegated authority. The Defendant's alleged 
44 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
misrepresentations therefore did not occur "in connection with" the 
offer or sale of securities because he never made any representa-
tions to either Issacs or Brgoch regarding Red River Mountain 
before the sale of the security was completed. 
In the absence of Utah law focusing upon the "in connection 
with the offer, sale or purchase" requirement of U.C.A. § 61-1-1, 
it is appropriate to look at the case law that has developed around 
similarly worded federal provisions. The language of Section 
61-1-1(2) tracks closely with Section 17(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2), which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly --
To obtain money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. . . 
The foregoing federal statute has been interpreted in numerous 
federal appellate decisions. In Braka v. Multibanch Comermex, 
S.A., 589 F.Supp. 802 (SDNY 1984), plaintiff/purchasers brought an 
action under 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) to recover money allegedly owed on 
two certificates of deposit and to rescind the certificates and 
recover damages. The district court granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss in part because the alleged misrepresentations and nondis-
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closures of the defendant occurred after the sales to plaintiffs 
and therefore could not be in "in connection" with the sales of 
securities. "It is well established that a misrepresentation or a 
nondisclosure, to be actionable under §77q/ must occur 'in 
connection1 with the sale, i.e. at or before the time the buyer 
commits himself to the sale." Id. at 805 n.3 (emphasis added). 
Resource Investors Group v. National Resource Inv. Corp., 457 
F.Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978), presented a situation where one of 
the defendants charged with a violation of U.S.C. § 78j(b) had had 
no relationship with any of the parties in the lawsuit until after 
the plaintiff had purchased working interests in certain oil and 
gas wells. The district court granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment because defendant "could not have participated in 
any fraud 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty. ' " Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an action for 
injunctive sanctions alleging that the defendants had participated 
in securities law violations in connection with a merger in 
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. National Student Marketing Corp., 
457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In that case the court addressed 
the required "nexus" between the alleged misconduct and the 
purchase or sale of a security. The court concluded that: "Once 
the decision is made and the parties are irrevocably committed to 
the transaction, there is little justification for penalizing 
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alleged omissions or misstatements which occur thereafter and which 
have no effect on the decision." Id. at 703. 
In Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder 
Peabody & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986), the investor 
brought an action against the securities dealer who executed 
transactions initiated by the investor's agent, and which resulted 
in losses. The Seventh Circuit concluded that there could be no 
violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when the plaintiff had 
transferred to its agent full authority to make investment deci-
sions: 
The Congregation made no investment decisions; 
it hired Mr. Newell [like Mr. Harry in the 
instant case] for that purpose. Mr. Newell 
had 'full discretion to develop and implement 
a prudent portfolio strategy.' 
800 F.2d at 181. 
In the instant matter, there was no "investment decision" to 
be made after the time when both Issacs and Brgoch learned of the 
necessity for future payments and that the investment had been made 
in Red River Mountain. 
The Defendant might have had exposure under a different 
criminal statute. However, the State elected not to charge the 
Defendant with the offense of Unlawful Dealing with Property by a 
Fiduciary (U.C.A. § 76-6-513), and instead alleged a violation of 
the Securities Fraud Statute. The Defendant's "market transac-
tions" with Issacs and Brgoch were not violative of U.C.A. 
Al 
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§ 61-1-1. The Defendant did not discuss the Red River Mountain 
investments with either Issacs or Brgoch before making the invest-
ment. Thus, there were no omissions or misrepresentations, as 
required by U.C.A. § 61-1-1 to "make the statements made not 
misleading." 
The facts established by the State do not constitute the 
public offense of Securities Fraud, and therefore, judgment of 
acquittal on Counts 2 and 3 is mandated by the provisions of Rule 
23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the alternative, 
the Defendant submits that he is entitled to a new trial due to the 
Court's refusal to grant the Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict at the end of the State's case. The Court's refusal in 
this regard had "a substantial effect upon the rights of the 
Defendant" and thereby constitutes a basis for the granting of a 
new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse the 
Defendant's convictions and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED th i s J^ day of /VfiAJll , 1993. 
V^^ioPM 7" 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JRf, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing to be mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, 
this 0i\ day of k ^ J |, 1993, to: 
David Sonnenreich 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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VIRL THORNTON 
I. Only bought because he thought my father and I had. 
A. He seems confused as to who my father is. 
1. Father-Gordon Harry Grandfather-Elbert Harry 
2. Believes father owned cleaners, when grandfather 
did . 
a. Did know however that grandfather lived in 
/ Az. (Tr pg.47)(how is that?) 
y 3 . Never made any previous investments decisions as 
to whether or not either my father/grandfather or 
1 had participated. 
B. Suitability 
1. Networth over $1,000,000 
a. Stock & bond Portfolio- over $400,000 
jL. Partner in development of trailer park in Sandy, 
y It. approx value o? $3-400,000. (Tr pg. 24) 
a. unlimited liability 
3. $15,000 investment less than 2% of networth, 4% of 
investment portfolio. Well within reasonable 
limits of "prudent-man". 
4. Red River well within parameters of preservation 
of principal, with growth potential, if deal was 
as presented. 
a. Spends every winter in Arizona. Knows 
Arizona real estate market. 
b. Has not lost any money in this partnership. 
5. I told him Private Ledger not involved in 
offer ing. 
a. (Tr pg.ll) Did I make any representation 
regarding PL involvement?- "No" 
b. (Tr pg.13) Can't remember whether P/L name 
is on door. (it is) 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
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4 ( 
page 2 
c. (Tr pg.20) Can't remember if document was 
bound. 
(it was) 
6. Acknowledges signing supscription agreement. 
a. Question as to whether he wrote in number "3" 
or read page 5, was never answered. (Tr pg. 
62) 
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PORTFOLIO 
for 
VIRL THORNTON 
PROGRAM 
APPROX 
AMOUNT YEAR TYPE 
Oil/Gas Exploration 
Enviordvne 
Unknown 
Equity Oil 
Sandy Mobile Home 
Park 
Unknown 
Centruty Prop 
Hampton Inns 
Red River LTD 
10, 000 
15, 000 
7, 500 
10, 000 
135, 000 
10, 000 
25, 000 
50, 000 
15, 000 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1988 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estat 
Oil & Gas 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estat 
DeveloDe 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estat 
Hotel Dev 
Real Estat 
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IKE ISAACS 
Suitability 
A. Portfolio value over $600,000 
B. Participant in at least 10 other partnerships. 
1. Acknowledges that RR is partnership (Tr pg 85) 
C. Acknowledges an objective of some growth. (Tr pg. 72-
73, S3) 
D. $30,000 investment 5% of portfolio. Reasonable 
divers i ficat ion . 
1.. Could be dangerous if shown that I knew of 
additional payments. 
2. Has history of involvement with at least one other 
partnership with additional payments. 
E. Knows Phoenix real estate (Tr pg 80) 
Power of Attorney 
A. Acknowledging my authority to trade for his benefit (Tr 
pg. 73, 74, 75, 80, 86, 93 
B. Sonnenreich did not establish whether Isaacs thought RR 
a P/L deal . (Tr pg 78) 
C. Established that questions were sometime after 
investment was made. (Tr pg 87 
1. Satisfied with answers (Tr pg 87) 
D. He was told not to make additional payments. This was 
not deal shown to us. (Tr pg 93) 
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PORTFOLIO 
for 
SEYMOUR (IKE) ISAACS 
PROGRAM 
Opt ion Spread 
Premier Angus 
Can/Am 
Arlington Park 
Century Properties 
Utah/Ohio Oil 
Century Properties 
Energy Income 
Polaris Income 
Red River Ltd. 
APPROX 
SAMOUNT YEAR 
10,000 1975 
20,000 1976 
10,000 1977 
60,000 (Staged 1977 
payments) 
10,000 1979 
10,000 1980 
40,000 1984 
40,000 1984 
40,000 1985 
30,000 1988 
TYPE 
Commodit ies 
Cattle Feed 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate/ 
Susidized Hsng 
Real Estate 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate 
Oil & Gas 
Equipment Lease 
Real Estate 
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FRANK BRGOCH 
I. Suitablity 
A. Porfolio value over $600,000 
B. Participant in at least 14 other partnerships. 
C. $30,000 investment o% of portfolio. Reasonable 
deivers i f icat ion . 
1. Involved with at least one other partnership with 
additional payments. 
D. Knows Phoenix real estate market. (Tr pg 119) 
E. States he didn't want partnerships or long-term. (Tr pg 
101) 
1. Coflicts with investment history both before and 
after psuedo-retirement. 
F. Acknowledges real estate is suitable investment. (Tr pg 
117) 
G. Visit General Partner, acknowledged what I had told 
him.( Tr pg 119, 122) 
II. Power of attorney 
A. Sonnenreich did not establics whether Brgoch thought RR 
was P/L deal. (Tr pg 101) 
B. Acknowledges my authority to trade for his benefit. (Tr 
pg 103, 106, 115, 118) 
C. Established that questions asked some time after 
initial investment. (Tr pg 110-111) 
D. Don't make additional payments, not the deal that we 
were shown. (Tr pg 112, 122) 
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LIMITED PARNERSHIP PORTFOLIO 
for 
Frank Brgoch 
PROGRAM 
Option Spread 
Premier Angus 
Energy Management 
Essex Towers 
Century Proper 
Can/Am 
Utah/Ohio Oil 
Unknown 
Century Proper 
Energy Income 
Polaris Income 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Red River Ltd. 
ties 
t ies 
$ AMOUNT 
10, 
20, 
10, 
55, 
10, 
5, 
10, 
10, 
40, 
40, 
40, 
10, 
7, 
30, 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
500 
000 
(St 
pay 
aged 
ment: 
YEAR 
1975 
1976 
197S 
1977 
s) 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1984 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
TYPE 
Commod it ies 
Cattle Feed 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate/ 
Subsidized Hsng 
Real Estate 
Oil & Gas 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate 
Real Estate 
Oil Income 
Equipment Lease 
Real Estate 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate 
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UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 61-1-1 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
61-1-21. Penalties for violations — Limitation of prosecu-
tions. 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter except Sec-
tion 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or 
who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false 
or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. No person 
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he 
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment or information may be 
returned or complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the 
alleged violation. 
61-1-27. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make imiform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. 
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17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
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